

CHANGE OF POWER TEAM IN UKRAINE: WHAT'S NEXT– DEVELOPMENT OR BALANCING?

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Actuality. Dynamic of social and political processes in Ukraine allows to understand their connection with the development of civil society.


The aim of the study is to set up significance of change of power team in Ukraine (presidential election) in 2004 and 2010 as the potency of social development.

Theoretical frame of analysis of situation – is a complicated co-ordination concept. Complication is an intermediate phase between chaos and order (Holland), that takes the characteristic of global precondition of human existence: the number of subjects, viewpoints and contacts increases; significance intensifies; vagueness multiplies (lack of information lucidity, accuracy of relationships of cause and effect); interdependence of any processes and rate of changes of every listed components increases.

Social and psychological dimension of these processes is exposed, first of all, through rise of coordination complication (complicated co-ordination) between people within certain social orderliness of social systems: communities, corporations, organizations, individual groups and societies as a whole. Complicated co-ordination is a characteristic feature of the intensive development stage in the organization, being both positively and negatively directed. Negative consequences of complicated co-ordination are shown in different phenomena: status struggle, intellectual disparity, power balancing, different objectivity, different value, caused by lack of reflexion of external or internal reasons of complexity, they do reduce the efficiency of organization.

At the chaos phase the interaction is liquid. At the order phase it is stable. At the complexity phase the interactions adapting to different conditions are generalized. Here, there are motives for power balancing. In terms of organizational psychology it characterises the state of system, when none of its party doesn't offer to overcome complication of solution, which would satisfy everybody, and proffers of intervention display the lack of these proffers, that force to balance. In such situation the clearing up of interaction rules is an essence of adaptability. Herewith the complexity doesn't have an influence on the interaction of partners, who have concluded an agreement, while it has a great effect without it.

Complicated co-ordination as a state of social system is an actuality of present organizational practice. However this conceptual construct may be applied for the analysis of society as a social system as well.



The phenomenon of power balancing is important for our analysis, in terms of the goal of the study.

The empirical analysis is based on system long-term monitoring of public opinion on urgent issues of social and political life, which was made by the Institute of Social and Political Psychology of NAPS of Ukraine under the supervision of its director Sliusarevskiy M. We analyzed the period from 2004 till 2010. In general, there are compared data of seven surveys, and at least 2000 respondents participated in each of them.

Special attention is paid to the periods of the first months after accession to power new political teams (that were named by citizens " the orange" and " the blue")

after the election of President of the country (May, 2005 and August 2010). We briefly describe the differences between these political forces. We point out that position of power before election in 2004 was characterized by multidirectional foreign policy and vagueness (hidden) of the position of right-wing forces concerning the attitude to property. "Orange" government showed itself as opposition to the former government, and also to the Soviet model of government, declaring openly and definitely to follow the Euro-Atlantic vector in foreign policy. It was signaling for changes in all social strata. The political force of "the blue" in 2004 was based largely on criticism of radical politics and continuation of policy of multidirectional, preservation of benefits, privileges for certain strata of population that is the evidence of patriarchy. In 2010, after accession to power of "the blue", more significant became strengthening of the Eastern vector, that found expression in cancellation of the North Atlantic orientation in foreign policy. The position of big capital became more produced for society.

There were determined the basic and subsidiary data among the empirical data file. To the basic data there were referred ratings of trust to the central state authorities and other social institutions in the first months after presidential election of 2004 and 2010 years, that correlate with data concerning electoral activity, support by the citizens of Ukraine of different political forces in dynamics, their attitude towards changes in electoral legislation. Subsidiary data is that, which characterizes population's perception of economic operations of the Government and tendency of Ukrainian population's feeling of national identity, that concerns the situation of the first months after accession to power of political force in 2010. Their involvement

enables to understand more profoundly the situation from the position of the set goal – does accumulation of positive changes take place in society, i.e. does its development happen.

Data, that was analyzed, is presented in tables, polled in 2004 — 2010 are the following:

17–25. 05. 2004	3–10. 05. 2005	18–25. 10. 2006	22–26. 09. 2007	24–30.11. 2008	18–24. 12. 2009	26–31.08, 2010
2007	1217	2293	2000	2014	2005	N=2003

Considerable difference in ratings of trust to the central authorities in the first months after presidential election in 2004 and 2010 attracts attention. In August 2010 level of population’s confidence to the President of Ukraine decreased on 26,6%: part of those, who in May, 2005 answered positively the question *"Do You trust the listed below power structures and social institutions?"* in the part of trust to the President of Ukraine, made 61,1%, in August 2010 - 34,5% . Also the rating of trust substantially reduced to the Cabinet of Ministers (from 48,2% to 28,4%) and to Verhovna Rada of Ukraine (from 35,3% to 22,9%). However, the trust of citizens somewhat increased to the media (from 41,5% to 44,9%), public organizations (from 33,8% to 39,8%), local authorities (from 24,1% to 30,7%), trade unions (from 24,2% to 30,0%). Ratings of education system didn’t change and remained high (49,60 i 51,4% in May 2005 and in August 2010 respectively), and the church (64,6% and 62,8% respectively). So on the background of confidence reduction to the central state authorities, the trust to the social institutions increased.

The dynamics of the ratings of power bodies, other public institutions

	The Rating of Trust (completely trust + probably, do not trust)						The Rating of non-Trust (probably, do not trust + absolutely do not trust)						Summarized criterion of the balance of trust – non-trust								
	17–25. 05. 2004	3–10. 05. 2005	18–25. 10. 2006	22–26. 09. 2007	24–30. 11. 2008	18–24. 12. 2009	26–31.08, 2010	17–25. 05. 2004	3–10. 05. 2005	18–25. 10. 2006	22–26. 09. 2007	24–30. 11. 2008	18–24. 12. 2009	26–31.08, 2010	17–25. 05. 2004	3–10. 05. 2005	18–25. 10. 2006	22–26. 09. 2007	24–30. 11. 2008	18–24. 12. 2009	26–31.08, 2010
The President of Ukraine	15,0	61,1	27,9	27,5	16,4	14,0	34,5	74,2	29,9	60,7	59,0	71,5	76,0	53,8	-59,2	+31,2	-32,7	-31,5	-55,1	-62,0	-19,3
Supreme Council	11,5	35,3	21,3	22,7	9,8	12,6	22,9	71,6	44,0	60,3	63,0	75,3	77,2	67,9	-60,1	-8,7	-39,0	-40,3	-65,5	-64,6	-45,0

	The Rating of Trust (completely trust + probably, do not trust)						The Rating of non-Trust (probably, do not trust + absolutely do not trust)						Summarized criterion of the balance of trust – non-trust								
	17-25.05. 2004	3-10.05. 2005	18-25.10. 2006	22-26.09. 2007	24-30.11. 2008	18-24.12. 2009	26-31.08, 2010	17-25.05. 2004	3-10.05. 2005	18-25.10. 2006	22-26.09. 2007	24-30.11. 2008	18-24.12. 2009	26-31.08, 2010	17-25.05. 2004	3-10.05. 2005	18-25.10. 2006	22-26.09. 2007	24-30.11. 2008	18-24.12. 2009	26-31.08, 2010
Verhovna Rada of Ukraine																					
The Cabinet of Ministers (Government) of Ukraine	14,9	48,2	27,5	29,3	20,1	19,7	28,4	66,6	33,6	56,1	56,0	62,6	68,8	58,3	-51,7	+14,6	-28,6	-26,7	-42,5	-49,1	-29,9
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	22,6	21,0	25,3	25,1	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	51,8	53,4	53,1	49,8	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	-29,2	-32,4	-27,8	-24,7
The Supreme Court of Ukraine	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	23,4	23,7	25,2	25,5	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	50,2	50,8	53,8	46,8	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	-26,8	-27,1	-28,6	-21,3
local courts(regional , town, district)	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	19,8	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	61,8	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	-42,0
General Prosecutor of Ukraine	17,7	16,4	was not in the list	18,3	18,1	18,6	23,0	64,7	60,5	was not in the list	53,7	56,0	61,2	47,4	-47,0	-44,1	was not in the list	-35,4	-37,9	-42,6	-24,4
The National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	23,6	21,9	29,0	30,4	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	41,8	46,8	44,4	35,2	was not in the list	was not in the list	was not in the list	-18,2	-24,9	-15,4	-4,8

	The Rating of Trust (absolutely trust + rather trust)							The Rating of non-Trust (rather don't trust + absolutely don't trust)							Summarized criterion of the balance of trust – non-trust						
	17-25. 05. 2004	3-10. 05. 2005	18-25. 10. 2006	22-26. 09. 2007	24-30. 11. 2008	18-24. 12. 2009	26-31.08, 2010	17-25. 05. 2004	3-10. 05. 2005	18-25. 10. 2006	22-26. 09. 2007	24-30. 11. 2008	18-24. 12. 2009	26-31.08, 2010	17-25. 05. 2004	3-10. 05. 2005	18-25. 10. 2006	22-26. 09. 2007	24-30. 11. 2008	18-24. 12. 2009	26-31.08, 2010
Central Election Committee	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	27,7	20,0	28,4	35,8	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	49,4	57,9	49,4	41,4	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	-21,7	-37,9	-21,0	-5,6
The Ukrainian mass-media	26,1	33,7	41,5	30,6	37,7	42,2	44,9	55,9	43,8	38,0	50,7	43,6	39,8	38,7	-29,1	-10,1	+3,5	-20,1	-5,9	+2,4	+6,2
Public Organizations	33,2	35,2	33,8	30,0	33,4	38,1	39,8	37,1	32,2	32,4	31,9	30,5	31,7	26,4	-3,9	+3,0	+1,4	-1,9	+2,9	+6,4	+13,4
Military Forces of Ukraine	31,0	50,4	41,1	47,1	39,5	44,6	48,6	48,0	26,2	38,5	31,8	34,2	34,0	30,7	-17,0	+24,2	+2,6	+15,3	+5,3	+10,6	+17,9
The Police	14,0	19,8	18,7	27,2	22,8	22,1	21,6	76,6	65,5	69,6	57,4	62,8	64,6	68,0	-62,6	-45,7	-50,9	-30,2	-40,0	-42,5	-46,4
Local Government Bodies	12,4	19,9	24,1	31,2	26,8	27,8	30,7	74,2	62,5	61,4	50,1	55,3	56,8	56,2	-61,8	-42,6	-37,3	-18,9	-28,5	-29,0	-25,5
The National Bank of Ukraine	27,2	31,4	37,3	30,9	17,6	19,8	28,5	48,7	41,8	36,4	37,3	57,6	58,4	47,0	-21,5	-10,4	+0,9	-6,4	-40,0	-38,6	-18,5
The Politic Parties	10,5	14,5	13,3	18,1	11,5	13,4	16,0	68,3	57,0	65,7	58,2	67,0	67,2	66,3	-57,8	-42,5	-52,4	-40,1	-55,5	-53,8	-50,3
The Trade Unions	20,7	21,0	24,2	27,1	22,7	29,6	30,0	59,0	50,2	47,6	44,1	44,6	46,0	46,6	-38,3	-29,2	-23,4	-17,0	-21,9	-16,4	-16,6
Educational system	36,9	40,5	49,6	55,7	41,1	49,1	51,4	43,9	36,7	31,7	25,3	33,3	30,1	27,6	-7,0	+3,8	+17,9	+30,4	+7,8	+19,0	+23,8
Security Service of	27,0	38,5	33,7	34,9	27,3	34,1	33,4	52,3	38,6	40,8	34,2	40,1	39,6	36,1	-25,3	-0,1	-7,1	+0,7	-12,8	-5,5	-2,7

Ukraine																						
The Church	57,4	63,7	64,6	62,1	56,0	59,5	62,8	23,9	15,8	17,0	16,8	20,5	17,4	18,4	+33,5	+47,9	+47,6	+45,3	+35,5	+42,1	+44,4	

The ratings of trust were compared with the elective activity of citizens within the periods analyzed.

Distribution of answers to the following question *"If today there were elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, would you participate in voting?"*, in %

	November 2005		October 2008		February, 2009		June, 2009		October 2009		November 2009		August 2010	
Definitely yes	50,6	82,2	23,0	52,8	26,5	60,5	33,0	68,6	32,7	69,6	35,5	74,3	31,6	70,7
Rather yes	31,6		29,8		34,0		35,6		36,9		38,7		39,1	
Rather no	5,1	7,8	17,2	36,1	16,0	28,8	11,7	21,4	12,0	22,7	7,4	14,7	11,7	21,5
Definitely no	2,7		18,9		12,8		9,7		10,7		7,3		9,8	
Difficult to answer	10,0		11,1		10,8		10,0		7,7		11,0		7,7	

If after the first months of the "orange" team administration the elective activity of citizens was at 82,2 % level, then in August 2010 its indicators have decreased by 11.5%, and made 70,7%. Besides, there was a significant decrease in the number of those citizens who would participate in the elections (from 50,6% in May 2005 to 31,6% in August 2010), and increase in the number of those who would definitely refuse to vote (from 2,7% to 9,8% respectively).

Shifts in the population preferences regarding the main political forces within the periods under analyses looks like the following. In May 2005 for "blue" party 19,6% of respondents would vote, in August 2010 – 21,9%, for "orange" party (the block by Juliya Tymoshenko and National Union Our Ukraine) 30,9% and 13,8% respectively. Among those who had the intention to participate in the elections the share of "blue" followers has increased by 7,3% (from 22,0% in May 2005 to 29,3% in August 2010), and among those who have already decided on their political choice – by 9,6% (from 25,1% in 2005 to 34,7% in 2010). The support of the "orange" political force reveals the opposite tendency: among those who had the intention to participate in the elections, 34,5% would support it in 2005, while in 2010 it would win only 16,8% share (the difference is 17,7%), and among those who have already decided on their political choice, 35,1% and 19,8% (difference 15,3%).

Thus, according to data sampling in general there are quite stable indicators of "blue" force support and its strengthening among active electorate, while the electorate share of "orange" force has evidently and significantly decreased in different by activity shares of interviewed people. It's evident that there is a disappointment in the "orange" team which hasn't met the overstated expectations of the citizens. However, the absence of the significant increase in the electorate of the opposite political force can demonstrate the shifts in the attitude to authority in Ukraine in general.

DISAPPOINTMENT REGARDING UNJUSTIFIED OVERSTATED EXPECTATIONS RELATED WITH ORANGE AUTHORITY

Distribution of answers to the following question *"For which political party listed below would you vote today on elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine?"*, in %

	According to data sampling in general						Among those who have the intention to participate in elections (definitely yes + rather yes)						Among those who have the intention to participate in elections and has decided on political choice					
	October 2008	February 2009	June 2009	October 2009	November 2009	August 2010	October 2008	February 2009	June 2009	October 2009	November 2009	August 2010	October 2008	February 2009	June 2009	October 2009	November 2009	August 2010
The Party of Regions <i>(V. Yanukovich)</i>	19,6	21,4	21,8	20,5	26,4	21,9	27,0	23,0	28,1	26,2	32,6	29,3	30,6	28,6	31,5	30,1	36,6	34,7
The block by Juliya Tymoshenko <i>(J. Tymoshenko)</i>	17,9	15,7	14,9	15,5	17,7	12,1	21,9	17,9	18,3	20,1	21,9	14,7	24,8	22,3	20,5	23,2	24,6	17,4
The Party Strong Ukraine <i>(S. Tigipko)</i>	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	8,6	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	10,5	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	Not available in the list	12,4
The Party The Front of Changes <i>(A. Yatsenyuk)</i>	2,8	7,9	9,8	7,9	7,9	6,5	3,8	8,2	11,9	9,7	8,9	7,4	4,3	10,2	13,3	11,2	10,0	8,8
All-Ukrainian Alliance Freedom <i>(O. Tyagnybok)</i>	2,2	2,5	2,8	2,5	2,7	3,6	3,3	3,1	3,1	3,2	3,3	4,5	3,7	3,8	3,5	3,7	3,7	5,3
The Communist Party of	6,2	6,0	5,6	5,5	4,8	3,5	8,8	7,4	7,4	7,0	5,2	4,2	10,0	9,2	8,3	8,1	5,8	5,0

	According to data sampling in general						Among those who have the intention to participate in elections (definitely yes + rather yes)						Among those who have the intention to participate in elections and has decided on political choice					
	October 2008	February 2009	June 2009	October 2009	November 2009	August 2010	October 2008	February 2009	June 2009	October 2009	November 2009	August 2010	October 2008	February 2009	June 2009	October 2009	November 2009	August 2010
Ukraine (<i>P. Simonenko</i>)																		
The Block by Lytvyn (<i>V. Lytvyn</i>)	4,8	4,7	3,7	3,2	4,6	1,9	6,3	6,1	4,7	4,0	4,7	2,6	7,2	7,5	5,2	4,6	5,3	3,0
The Party Our Ukraine (<i>V. Yushchenko</i>)	4,5	3,2	2,9	2,7	2,2	1,7	6,7	4,5	3,6	3,4	2,6	2,1	7,6	5,6	4,0	3,9	2,9	2,4
The Socialist Party of Ukraine (<i>A. Moroz</i>)	1,4	1,4	1,2	0,9	1,2	0,8	1,6	1,6	1,2	1,1	1,2	0,9	1,9	2,0	1,3	1,2	1,4	1,1
The Progressive Socialistic Party of Ukraine (<i>N. Vitrenko</i>)	1,6	0,6	0,8	1,5	1,2	0,4	1,7	0,4	0,9	1,8	1,2	0,5	2,0	0,5	1,0	2,1	1,3	0,6
Other Parties (blocks)	0,9	0,6	0,6	1,0	1,3	0,6	1,0	0,3	0,4	1,1	1,3	0,8	1,1	0,3	0,5	1,2	1,5	1,0
I hesitate with the choice	13,8	17,8	13,0	14,8	14,2	17,5	11,7	19,4	10,8	13,1	11,1	15,7	–	–	–	–	–	–
I would indicate in bulletin that don't support any party or block)	7,4	7,6	8,5	9,3	6,2	8,8	3,3	5,5	5,6	7,0	4,4	6,9	3,8	6,9	6,3	8,1	5,0	8,2

Attitude of the population to the actions of the new political team

Further on for the more detailed analysis of the actual situation we will review data which characterize the attitude of the population to the actions of the new political team which came to power after the President's elections 2010. Let's have a look at the attitude of the citizens to the changes implemented by the authoritative political force to the electoral legislation of Ukraine. It will be the brief overview of the level of population support regarding the reforms suggested by the new authority in the

Do you support the listed below norms of the law specified

Distribution of answers to the question "*Recently the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has adopted the law on the local elections which would take place on the 31st of October this year . Do you support the listed below norms of the law specified?*" (in %)

	Support	Don't support	Difficult to answer	I don't care
Norm which anticipates the holding of elections to the Verkhovna Rada of the Crimea, regional, city and district councils under the mixed majority proportional system , and to village councils – only under majority system?	35,1	17,6	30,4	17
Norm according to which in the local elections only political parties and not their blocks have the right to participate?	33	23,4	26,4	17,2
Norm which makes it impossible for the local party organizations registered less than a year to the date of elections to participate in it, thus removing from the election process the new established political forces?	26,3	31,1	26,3	16,4
Norm which anticipates that candidates for the post of city mayor can be offered only by certain political forces and not by candidate running by himself ?	20,9	41,8	23,9	13,5
Distribution of answers to the question "Do you support the decision of the government regarding the increase of the gas tariffs for the population?" (in %)	2,1	5,4	17,4	68,8
	7,5		86,2	

The highest indicators of reform support hardly exceed the third part of the population (35,1%). Share of those who don't percept new norms fluctuates from 17,6% (introduction of mixed majority proportional system under the local elections (except for village councils) and elections to the Verkhovna Rada of the Crimea, and majority system – under elections to the village councils) to 41,8% (prohibition for independent candidates to run for the post of mayor).

Decision of the Government in the social an economic sphere, in particular its intention to increase the utility tariffs, is not supported by 86,2% of the interviewed people, 67,7% don't believe that promised by the Government providing of subsidies to separate classes of the population will eliminate the negative impact of such decision. It is noted that respondents don't believe in the officially announced version about the necessity of such action (to stabilize economics, to prevent breakdown of oil and gas sphere and housing and public utilities) – it is supported only by 12,6%. More than half of the respondents consider that the

Government do this in order to meet the requirements of the International Monetary Fund and take up the credit (30,8%), or to pay off the debt to gas magnates after the failure of the authority at the Stockholm arbitrary court (25,7%), thus not taking into account the needs and demands of the population. Also we consider important the insignificant percentage of those who don't care about social and economic actions of the Government. It makes only 2,5%, while to the issue of elections reforms from 13,5% to 17,2% of respondents are indifferent.

Such distribution of the population attitude to the changes in the elective legislation we consider to be the result of the «orange» efforts aimed at operationalizing of their mottos.

In general the specified data regarding the support of the election system reform correlate with the low trust rate to the central bodies of state authority, proving once again that citizens of Ukraine in their majority don't trust the main political forces acting in Ukraine. The implemented reforms don't assist in improving of the image of new authority, don't strengthen its position.

	agree	disagree	difficult to say	I do not care
The answers to the question "Do you support the government's decision to raise gas tariffs for the population?" (In%)	2,1	5,4	17,4	68,8
	7,5		86,2	

	agree	disagree	difficult to say	I do not care
The answers to the question "Do you share the hope of the officials that the negative social consequences of rising gas prices for households will be minimized by providing subsidies to citizens, for which new tariffs are not sustainable?" (In%)	12	67,7	17,8	2,5

The answers to the question "What primarily drives the government to rise gas prices for the population?" (In%)

to fulfill the requirements of the	to stabilize the economy, stop the	to pay the gas magnate whom our government lost	other point of view	difficult to say	I do not know

International Monetary Fund and to receive a loan	destruction of oil and gas industry and housing and utilities infrastructure	the process in the Stockholm Arbitration Court			nothing about it
30,8	12,6	25,7	5	18,7	7,1

The apportionment of answers to the question *"How did you perceive the celebration of the 19-th anniversary of Ukraine's independence "* (in%)

	1999	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2010
It arouse in me as a citizen the feeling of pride	8,4	7,0	9,9	7,9	15,8	15,3	14,7	12,3	7,9	15,0
Alongside with the pride I felt the bitterness of unjustified expectations	20,4	23,1	23,2	19,8	22,2	27,0	22,8	19,5	19,3	24,0
First of all, it was an opportunity to have fun and relax	10,8	9,2	12,6	10,2	12,5	12,4	12,1	13,8	10,8	14,9
I believe this festive tumult to be an attempt to hide the collapse and the miserable situation in the country	35,9	37,7	35,0	37,9	24,2	23,3	24,7	20,8	34,9	18,8
This day is not a holiday for me	15,1	15,6	14,3	16,7	13,9	14,5	19,1	21,7	22,6	21,0
Difficult to say	9,4	7,4	5,0	7,5	11,3	7,5	6,7	11,8	4,4	6,4

It is necessary to distinguish between different sources of power balancing. Population as an active participant opposing by shift in the balance of choice and the ruling elite itself, which considers non-efficiency of divorcing from expectations of society. That is the balancing and the development in various sectors is not linear.

The victory of the "blue camp" in the presidential election in 2010 was provided by meeting the alternative expectations (as compared to the previous government). The defeat of the orange forces occurred not because the motions of the other political forces (the blue camp) met national expectations, but because the "blue camp" kept waiting (being consistent in their support) within their electorate.

Increase in ratings of trust in public institutions and decline in confidence to the central government authority can be an argument of efficiency of the "orange" government in the development of democratic standards. On the other hand, political participation beyond the logic of "orientation" to the center "activity increased the importance of NGOs, trade unions, media, local authorities, as they helped to meet the interests, although this activity has not yet made clear that that was the main, meaningful achievement of the orange government. (The significance of these changes as the main achievement of the "orange" government). Explanation of the awareness fragmentarity lies both in the "springtime" of new forms of participation, as well as in the continuation of stereotypes of "patriarchy", "consumerism" in relation to which the orange central government has not deployed any special social reconstruction projects to fulfill their slogans. On this basis the internal contradictions manifested in a mode of openness formed only the picture of scandal and superseded the picture of development.

Against the background of growing importance of other areas of political participation (the media, local authorities, NGOs) the importance of electoral choice has decreased. The reason for this is an ineffective actions of central authorities. Search of citizens for the electoral choice as a factor in satisfying their expectations has clearly decreased.

Conclusions

The period of "orange" team ruling was characterized by more intensive processes of civil society development and higher credit of citizen trust to the authority. They expected the central authority to make changes, that characterizes paternalistic type of civil relations typical of posttotalitarian society. Today together with the decreasing of trust to the authority, increases trust towards other social institutions, the reconstruction of paternalistic expectations takes place. Generally it favours further civil society development.

Conducted analysis indicates significant decreasing of population political process involvement which takes place against economic factor efficiency increasing in relations between the authority and society, and still the great influence of geopolitical factor. The leading self-realization tendency forecast consists in the determination by its need of electorate field balance keeping. It does not favour principal policy implementation, apparently aimed at the development according to the plan. But the definition of balancing as the authority politics is not single-valued, which apparently does not favour the development, but hinders it. The authority increasing of not state factors under conditions power keeping from the lapse into tough authoritarianism in Ukraine indicates favourable **social psychological** conditions for civil society development.

The sufficiency of self-organization powers of civil society institutions development authoritarianism tendencies prevention requires additional investigation.

Let's theoretically formulate working model which in contrast to the organization as a system in sociosystem at society level the heterochrony of different phases of existence is possible-from chaos because of the difficulty to order – its subsystems. As for more complicate system society may have nonlinear relations. It gives extrinsic evidence to see not only risks in balancing, but also resources for development. To draw a parallel between systems of the organization level and the society admits the use with regard to the latter of reflexive approaches in reference to the ruling.